https://www.site/2013-08-19/kto_kak_i_zachem_proslushivaet_vashi_razgovory_i_chitaet_perepisku_issledovanie_site

“Shhhh. This is not over the phone"

Who, how and why listens to your conversations and reads your correspondence. Study site

"Not on the phone." “I’ll call you back from another number now.” “Let’s go outside and take a walk, it’s better not to talk here.” Such phrases have become firmly established in the life of the Russian establishment, but just a few years ago those who complained about wiretapping of phones and offices were mistaken for half-crazy people, like those who wear tin foil hats and believe in the zombie rays of the KGB. Today everyone knows: they listen to everyone, they listen without regard to the law, and the materials of these wiretaps are more often used not in court, but in political intrigues, denunciations, and provocations. the site spoke with one of the professionals of the shadow market of electronic intelligence to find out how this sphere works.

Who's listening

In the language of law enforcement agencies, wiretapping telephones and monitoring Internet traffic is called the abbreviation “SORM” - “System of technical means to ensure the functions of operational-search activities.” SORM-1 is a set of measures aimed at wiretapping mobile communications, SORM-2 – mobile Internet traffic. Today, such investigative methods are coming to the fore, eclipsing traditional forensic approaches. Accordingly, the units responsible for SORM are becoming increasingly influential within the internal affairs bodies. In the Sverdlovsk region, this is, for example, the Bureau of Special Technical Measures (BSTM) of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Sverdlovsk Region and the Operational and Technical Department (OTO) of the FSB Directorate for the Sverdlovsk Region.

According to the law, wiretapping of telephones and monitoring of Internet traffic is possible only by a court decision. True, the law allows investigators to “turn on the recording” without it, if the case is urgent and wiretapping is necessary to prevent an impending crime. By approximately the same principle, investigators are “as an exception” allowed to conduct searches, receiving court approval after the fact. As in the case of searches, law enforcement officers often use this rule to gain uncontrolled access to other people's secrets.

There are also ways to legalize illegal wiretapping by placing the name and phone number of the desired person on a long list of suspects in some criminal case. As sources in the authorities say, judges almost never delve into how this or that surname is connected with a criminal case, and sign permission “in one fell swoop.” Such court decisions are classified as “secret”, and citizens will never know who was on the wiretapping list.

However, experts involved in wiretapping say: today, more and more often, citizens are being “recorded” without any court decisions at all. Each telecom operator has equipment installed that allows security forces to access the conversations of any client at any time (operators are required to do this by law). And in the regional department of the FSB there is a remote access terminal, with which you can start listening to any mobile user in a few clicks.

According to the law, several special services have the right to conduct wiretapping. In addition to the FSB itself, these are the Ministry of Internal Affairs, FSKN, GUFSIN, customs, FSO, SVR. But control over the equipment itself, which ensures the operation of SORM-1 and SORM-2, is under the control of the FSB. As experts explain, in order to put a particular number under wiretapping, employees from the police bureau of special technical measures do not have to run to the FSB and ask them to press a button: the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other agencies conducting operational investigative activities have their own access terminals. But they are connected “through the FSB,” that is, the main key is still located with the security officers.

“Therefore, for example, in the Roizman wiretapping case, it will be difficult to point all the fingers at the police and pretend that the FSB had nothing to do with it,” says the site’s interlocutor. According to him, responsibility for unauthorized wiretapping and its leakage in any case lies with two departments.

“Why do you need so many phones?”

How to protect yourself from wiretapping? Almost nothing. Firstly, it is useless to change SIM cards: it is not the mobile number that is used for wiretapping, but the unique number of the telephone device (IMEI). No matter what SIM card is installed in the phone, it will still be “live”.

Many representatives of the establishment and businessmen carry several phones with them, believing that one “ordinary” one is listened to, while others - the “leftists” - are not.. - If a person is wiretapped, law enforcement officers constantly receive information about the location of his phone. To do this, the phone does not necessarily have to have a GPS module installed; the location of even the simplest and cheapest handset is determined by base stations with an accuracy of one meter. And if you carry several handsets with you, geolocation data shows that next to your “main” number there are always 2-3 others. They are also immediately put on wiretapping, so walking around with a bunch of phones is completely pointless.”

However, there is a small trick with two handsets that allows you to relatively reliably keep the secret of negotiations. “Suppose there are two devices - A and B. A is used constantly, and there is reason to believe that it is being listened to. B – for confidential conversations, registered to another person. In this case, A and B should never be turned on at the same time or next to each other. If you need to make a call on the “secret” phone B, you turn off A, move further away, into the coverage area of ​​another base station, then turn on B and make a call. Then you turn off B, go again to another base station and then turn on A,” says our interlocutor. Another way is to constantly store a “secret” phone in some hidden place, each time arriving at it with the “main” mobile phone turned off.

Particularly cautious victims of wiretapping prefer to turn off the phone during an important conversation or hide it somewhere away. The site's interlocutor confirms that the possibility of recording via phone in standby mode exists, but this technology is used infrequently. “In these cases, the so-called microphone effect. This can only be done if a team of specialists works in close proximity to the interlocutors. The signal receiver and recording device must be somewhere nearby,” he explains.

How does it work

Another thing is ordinary wiretapping. It can be massive. Today in Yekaterinburg, the FSB’s capacity allows 25-50 thousand subscribers to listen simultaneously, in Moscow – hundreds of times more. The main problem is not how to record information, but how to decipher and process it. In the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Sverdlovsk Region, for example, there is a special department of “analysts” who are engaged in simply transcribing recorded conversations and turning audio into text. Now Sverdlovsk law enforcement officers, using the preparation for the 2018 World Cup and EXPO 2020 as an excuse, are setting themselves the task of increasing hardware wiretapping capacity. And creating more advanced systems for processing the information received is already a task for security forces not only at the Russian, but also at the global level. Recent scandals in the United States show that Russian intelligence services are far from the only ones involved in illegal or semi-legal “monitoring”.

The world leader in creating data analysis and processing systems for intelligence services is the American company Palantir Technologies. According to the site’s interlocutor, Palantir technologies are used by both American government organizations, such as the CIA, and Russian ones, including the FSB and the Information and Analytical Center of the Russian Government. “The last one is hard to wrap my head around. It turns out that the entire volume of government information, including secret information, goes through the American system..

In Russia, one of the largest suppliers of “analytical” software for intelligence services is also Avicomp Services. And hardware solutions and programs for “monitoring” (that is, wiretapping) are actively sold by the Novosibirsk company Signatek. Its website says that it offers “subjects of operational investigative activities” “systems for monitoring the communications of objects: telephone conversations, fax sessions, video calls, SMS messages, DVO, ICQ, email”, as well as “Systems for monitoring the movement of objects with visualization on map."

The product catalog contains examples of what the program interface for “monitoring” looks like:

What'sApp or Viber?

With the analysis of Internet traffic of suspicious citizens (SORM-2), the situation with the security forces is somewhat worse than with wiretapping of conversations. Although telecom operators provide intelligence agencies with any information in the same way, the analysis of this data itself is quite complex. “Any smartphone constantly downloads and sends huge amounts of data. Until recently, there was a huge problem in isolating information of interest from all this mass, for example, correspondence on Skype or WhatsApp. However, now this problem has been generally solved, and even in the regions they have learned to read Internet messengers,” says our interlocutor.

He calls the popular What’s App an extremely unsafe messenger - the information sent is not encrypted. Skype has such encryption, and it would have been reliable if the owners of the service, having entered the domestic market, had not shared decryption codes with Russian security forces. Therefore, today communication via Viber can be considered the most reliable, in which all data (both correspondence and voice conversations) are encrypted and are not yet available to domestic intelligence services (“This is why they are trying to ban Viber in the first place,” our interlocutor is sure). The site’s source does not trust the Telegram service, which is declared to be a “super-reliable” messenger, “as well as everything that is done in Russia, including by Pavel Durov.”

Another relatively reliable way to communicate is to use BlackBerry phones, which have their own messaging service, BlackBerry Messenger. The data in it is encrypted even more securely than in Viber; Russian security forces do not have access to it, and perhaps that is why BBM is banned in Russia. To use it, you have to buy a phone in the USA and “unlock” it from Russian specialists.

A major developer of programs and equipment for SORM-2 in Russia is the MFISOFT company, which supplies software for the FSB. The description of the SORMovich hardware and software complex given on their website states that it can place users under control by account name, phone number, email address, IP and ICQ number. The complex provides “detection and interception of mail messages at an email address”, “interception of files transferred via the FTP protocol”, “listening to IP telephony”, etc.

Who's being watched

Maybe the security forces would like to “listen to everyone,” but in reality there are only 200-300 people in Yekaterinburg under constant surveillance, the site’s interlocutor says. Most of them are suspected of extremism (primarily Islamist) and terrorism, members of organized crime groups under development, participants in large-scale opaque financial transactions (“cashers”, etc.).

“They are absolutely listening to the governor, his inner circle, and the top officials of the city. Deputies of the Legislative Assembly and City Duma are unlikely, only if someone was ordered by competitors. But this is a rare case, no one says anything important on the phone for a long time, and not many people are ready to spend 70 thousand rubles a day to wiretap a competitor,” says our source.

Recently, another proven way to become a victim of wiretapping has emerged - regularly criticize the current government or go to protest demonstrations. Of course, all participants in street actions will not be wiretapped, but the most active ones will be wiretapped. Ekaterinburg has long listened to Evgeny Roizman and Aksana Panova as opponents of Sverdlovsk Governor Evgeny Kuyvashev. Those around the governor do not hide the fact that printouts of their conversations regularly land on the table of the head of the region.

"FSBuk"

Recently, the analysis of information collected on social networks has played an increasingly significant role in the structure of SORM. With Facebook, the situation is more complicated, but even here the secrecy of communication is not guaranteed. “A relatively safe way to communicate is through Western email services: Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo,” says the site’s interlocutor. – The Tor network is also effective, guaranteeing anonymity to users. With its help, American journalists, among other things, communicate with their informants.”

To exchange information, more and more people and organizations are using cloud services like Dropbox, Yandex.Disk, Google disk and others. Law enforcement agencies are also interested in them. Among the popular services, Google's offering is considered relatively reliable, but our source advises paying attention to Wuala: an encrypted storage facility with servers in Switzerland. True, if you are saving your secrets not from Russian intelligence services, but from American ones, it is unlikely that anything will help you. A few days ago, another “ultra-secure” cloud service, Lavabit, was mysteriously shut down and all its users lost their information. Apparently, the fact is that Lavabit email was used by former CIA agent Edward Snowden.

Under the hood

It’s rare that a Russian businessman and politician today discusses on the phone something more important than fishing and football. Therefore, in addition to analyzing the actual texts of negotiations, electronic intelligence professionals are engaged in processing large amounts of data, identifying mathematical patterns, implicit connections, and on this basis building hypotheses about the interaction of certain groups or persons. The material for this may include telephone calls, emails, banking transactions, transactions for registration or liquidation of legal entities, etc. The resulting large diagrams are similar to those shown in one of the presentations of the already mentioned company Avicomp:

Illustration of electronic correspondence and monitoring of telephone conversations have already gone as far as the authors of dystopian novels never dreamed of. Probably, often the power of SORM helps prevent genuine terrorist attacks or real crimes. But much more noticeable to society are cases where electronic intelligence methods are used for political persecution and have nothing to do with legal procedures. At the same time, not only oppositionists, but also politicians loyal to the Kremlin suffer from uncontrolled surveillance. Compromising evidence collected using electronic means often becomes a weapon of the elite struggle against those who until recently themselves ordered the wiretapping of their enemies. In this sense, electronic intelligence has become a danger from which no one is immune.

Our information: How Ural politicians suffer from surveillance and try to save themselves

Everyone suffers from illegal wiretapping. Director of the Foundation for Support of Civil Initiatives “Legal Mission” (Chelyabinsk), Alexey Tabalov, told the site that “all his telephone conversations are being monitored” and he has been convinced of this more than once. Chairman of the Board of the Voice - Ural Foundation Yuri Gurman also assured us that in his organization the intelligence services listen to phones and look at email correspondence. “I know that they are listening, and let them listen. Although it gets disgusting,” he says.

Deputy of the Legislative Assembly of the Perm Territory Vladimir Nelyubin told the site that at the entrance to some high offices it is now customary to hand over the phone to the secretary. The banker himself uses classic Nokia, does not recognize modern instant messengers and is not going to protect himself from wiretapping. And the former head of the administration of the governor of the Kama region, Firdus Aliyev, is convinced that it is impossible to protect himself from wiretapping. “Such measures do not exist, it is an illusion. Only personal communication allows us to eliminate leaks as much as possible, so we have to fly [to meetings],” he told the site.

In the “Tyumen Matryoshka” only in the South, in Tyumen, have they accustomed themselves to instant messengers like Viber and WhatsApp: in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, 3G coverage is much worse and it is expensive to use them. But northern officials are actively using hardware against wiretapping. For example, in the office of one of the high-ranking officials there is a “jammer” behind the curtain, which he turns on during important conversations. As they say, this device makes an eerie sound, so talking for a long time when it is working is simply physically difficult.

The same manager tells absolutely fantastic stories about mobile communications. According to him, today security officers have equipment that, once they have recorded the timbre of your voice, if they need to write about you in the future, it will automatically turn on, no matter what phone you are talking on. Therefore, it makes no sense to change numbers and devices. The official is also quite suspicious of Apple products, although he has been using them since Dmitry Medvedev became president, who introduced the fashion for iPhones and iPads among government employees. However, he covered the camera lenses on both gadgets with black tape. The official is confident that the owners of the devices can be monitored using cameras.

One of the governors of the “Tyumen nesting doll” was observed without any iPhones. A video camera was found directly above the first person's bed in the official residence. Who ordered the surveillance (FSB or private individuals) has not yet been determined.

In the Tyumen North, in order not to become a “godsend for spies,” a few years ago they used the old grandfather’s methods - they liked to change mobile phones and SIM cards. One of the leaders of a large company told the site’s correspondent that there is a place near the shore of the Irtysh in Khanty-Mansiysk, passing over which a boat could run aground, so many telephones are sunk there.

The most thoughtful officials and businessmen will always prefer personal conversations to telephone conversations. Moreover, as one of them admitted, the most reliable way of communication is to write on a piece of paper, after which this piece of paper is simply burned.

Is it possible to eavesdrop on you through a switched off phone?

In addition to the legend about calculating the location of a phone using the triangulation method, there is another popular “horror story” periodically mentioned in the media.

It sounds like this: “Special services or criminal elements can secretly turn on the microphone in your phone and eavesdrop on the conversations you have while next to the phone.”

As with triangulation, carefully mixing fact and fiction can produce a fairly plausible-looking fiction.

Let's try to figure out how realistic such listening is.

The main tenets of the legend of eavesdropping

• IN any A mobile phone is initially equipped with the ability to record and listen to conversations, even when the mobile phone is turned off. We are not talking about equipping any one specific phone with eavesdropping tools to spy on any one specific person - all GSM phones have this capability.
• Eavesdropping can be activated at any time by intelligence agencies or attackers with sufficient resources. Listening happens remotely, without the use of additional equipment or human resources.
• The phone user cannot independently detect the fact of eavesdropping - it happens secretly.
• This opportunity secret. Any descriptions, documentation, etc. accessible only to special services and those close to them.

Let's start from the end - with secrecy.

Who came up with this and who has access to it?

The text of legislative acts regulating the wiretapping of telephone conversations during operational-search activities and the technical means necessary for this are available to anyone in most countries. It is not difficult to find on the Internet a description of the requirements for systems of assistance to operational investigative measures (SORM) used in Russia, or lawful interception systems used in the UK or the USA. After reading them, you can be sure that they are talking about listening telephone conversations of specific subscribers(phone numbers). About listening carried out at the central switching nodes of the network. There is no talk about any “remote microphone activation”.

Could it be that documents that speak of such a possibility exist, but are classified?

Since listening tools are built into any GSM phone, then there must be some specifications, which describe the parts and principles of their operation. Since intelligence agencies can use these capabilities, mobile operators have support for these functions in their equipment. In order for all this to be reliably classified, the following must be involved in the case:

1. The GSM Consortium, which has developed specifications for these listening tools, but keeps them secret (despite the fact that all other GSM specifications are available to anyone on the website http://www.3gpp.org). The specifications must describe, at a minimum, how to activate and deactivate phone tapping - what commands are sent to the SIM card or phone, how they interact with each other, and how all elements of the operator's network (switches, base station controllers, base stations, etc.) etc.) participate in the transmission and processing of these commands.
2. Manufacturers of GSM modules who do not produce phones themselves. They must have access to the secret specifications of the GSM Consortium and implement them in their products. That part of the documentation that describes the wiretapping system must be kept securely secret and transferred only to those clients who are also participating in the conspiracy of silence.
3. Manufacturers of equipment for building mobile networks (switches, base stations, etc.). They must also have access to the secret specifications of the GSM Consortium. Accurate implementation of classified specifications is especially important because mobile operators like to build their networks from equipment from different manufacturers - it is necessary that the different components of the eavesdropping system integrate well with each other, even if the system is made by different suppliers.
4. Integrator companies building mobile networks. They must be able to organize the operation of all subsystems of the mobile operator, including listening. To do this, their employees must attend secret courses organized by equipment manufacturers.
5. Mobile operators. They must provide access to the wiretapping system to the intelligence services of their country and ensure that the intelligence services of other countries do not gain access to them. But operators must also cooperate with each other to ensure that the listening system works even when the subscriber is roaming.
6. Mobile phone manufacturers. It is their responsibility to ensure the secrecy of eavesdropping - so that the phone supports all secret functions, but the subscriber cannot guess about their activation. Their warranty repair services must know that phones have the corresponding secret modules, be able to diagnose and repair them.
7. Intelligence services. They must be aware of how to work with operators.

This list could be continued further (adding SIM card manufacturers, etc.), but even in its current form it looks quite fantastic. After all, the secrecy of the specification implies that everyone who knows is silent, and no one knows. In the same time The current situation in the GSM equipment market is characterized by quite fierce competition, and there would definitely be manufacturers producing phones without a listening function. Extra microcircuits on phone boards and “bookmarks” in firmware would be found by enthusiasts whose bread is “unlocking” mobile phones. There would be specialists who would disable the ability to listen to your device for money. But nothing like this is observed in real life.

For comparison, the standard lawful interception functions:

1. Openly documented.
2. Their support is implemented at exactly one point in the network - on switches. Manufacturers have available documentation on the operation and administration of this functionality; the name, schedule and program of relevant training courses, etc. can be freely accessed.
3. They do not require any special support from manufacturers of phones, SIM cards, GSM modules, etc.
4. They do an excellent job of listening to telephone conversations of a specific subscriber, complementing other possible covert surveillance mechanisms.

Let us assume that such a global “conspiracy of silence” does exist. How does the secret listening system work? How can you implement such listening and transmitting what you listened to “where it’s needed?”?

Since listening occurs secretly, we can assume, for example, that the phone has alternative systems for encoding and storing information that is transmitted over a radio channel to some special antennas using a radio wave modulation system that is not similar to GSM. This assumption does not stand up to criticism: firstly, the GSM modules of modern phones are similar to each other, the microcircuits used and their functions are well known and described. If such eavesdropping capabilities are built into any phone, this means that neither enthusiasts who disassemble phones for repairs and upgrades, nor third-party repair shops have noticed anything suspicious in their design. But hiding another module in the phone, similar in functionality to a GSM transceiver, and even with its own separate antenna, is completely impossible. “Extra” details will be visible to any specialist. In the end, there is simply no place for this in a modern phone.

Secondly, transmitting what you listen to via alternative channels implies building a global network of receivers, the scale of which any mobile operator would envy, not to mention the fact that the question of financing such a project and dividing access to it between the intelligence services of different countries remains open.

However, supporters of the presence of undocumented capabilities do not go that far in their statements. Typically they say that after “activating the microphone” the phone makes a call to a certain number without the owner’s knowledge, after which everyone “on the other side” listens carefully and writes down.

The "hidden call" hypothesis

Can a phone make a call (using standard GSM network functions) to a certain number without the owner’s knowledge, and secretly? A number of uncomfortable questions immediately arise:

1. Why is the fact that there is an active call not visible in the phone interface?
2. How long will your phone battery last with constant listening?
3. What to do with the characteristic interference on the speakers of surrounding radio equipment that arises during a conversation?
4. Why is the call used for listening not visible in the detailed printout of the subscriber's calls? Who pays for it?

Point 1 is usually explained either by the participation of mobile phone manufacturers in a global conspiracy, or they write that intelligence services or a mobile operator remotely implement software into the phone that will hide suspicious activity from the user. Fortunately, there is currently no way to push active content to a phone that will run on any GSM phone.

There is no good counterargument to point 2, so in articles about miracle listening it is usually passed over in silence. After all, in modern phones the batteries last for about four to five hours of continuous conversation maximum - this is clearly not enough to organize constant listening.

Point number 3 is also usually passed over in silence. Obviously, for covert eavesdropping, the presence of such a “side effect” is completely unacceptable.

Point number 4 assumes that the intelligence services are in collusion with mobile operators. As part of this agreement:

1. The operator has nothing against the fact that his voice channels are used for wiretapping, and he doesn’t receive a single cent for hours of calls (we don’t consider the “secret services pay for the wiretapped” option as completely fantastic).
2. The operator excludes calls to intelligence service numbers from the detailed call printout and from all internal databases.
3. If the listener is in the coverage area of ​​another network (or in roaming), the operator additionally bears the costs associated with international roaming.
4. This conspiracy is valid at least for all operators in the country where the intelligence services in question operate.

Technically all this is feasible. However, what should be the motivation of the operators for them to agree to such a conspiracy, and a secret conspiracy at that?

The collusion involves significant financial losses on the part of the operators, so the incentive for cooperation must be quite significant. Obviously, we are not talking about the fact that operators were obliged to participate in the conspiracy by law or through blackmail - history shows that any attempts at extra-market pressure on operators by government structures immediately result in a wave of publications in the media. There is only one option left - the intelligence services paid the operators for work on modifying billing and the costs associated with wiretapping. You can, without a doubt, evaluate the realism of such a scenario for yourself.

So what do we have? Thanks to the global conspiracy of the main players in the mobile communications market, a secret method was invented and implemented to remotely activate the microphone of a mobile phone to carry out covert surveillance of the subscriber. Recorded conversations are transmitted “wherever they need to be” using standard GSM network tools. The intelligence services of a particular country are using this secret capability, and they are not stopped by the fact that their potential opponents have developed it. The intelligence services agree with all local mobile operators to conceal the fact of calls to a secret number belonging to the intelligence services. Now, at the risk of being noticed every second by the rapid discharge of the battery and interference from nearby radio equipment, intelligence services have the opportunity to listen to you for about 4-5 hours if you played into their hands and pre-charged the phone.

Think about whether the gamble is worth the candle for the intelligence services, given that there are many less global, less expensive and more effective ways to wiretap a specific person.

conclusions

Talk about the hidden ability to remotely activate the microphone of any phone is nothing more than talk. On the other hand, there is a standard documented technical ability to listen to and record telephone conversations of a specific, previously known subscriber.

The most obvious way is official wiretapping by the state.

In many countries around the world, telephone companies are required to provide access to telephone wiretap lines to competent authorities. For example, in Russia, in practice, this is carried out technically through SORM - a system of technical means to ensure the functions of operational-search activities.

Each operator is required to install an integrated SORM module on its PBX.

If a telecom operator has not installed equipment on its PBX to wiretap the phones of all users, its license in Russia will be revoked. Similar total wiretapping programs operate in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, the USA, Great Britain (Interception Modernization Program, Tempora) and other countries.

The corruption of government officials and intelligence officers is well known to everyone. If they have access to the system in "god mode", then for the right price you can have it too. As in all state systems, the Russian SORM is a big mess and typically Russian carelessness. Most technical specialists actually have very low qualifications, which allows unauthorized connection to the system without the notice of the intelligence services themselves.

Telecom operators do not control when and which subscribers are listened to via SORM lines. The operator does not check in any way whether there is a court sanction to wiretap a particular user.

“You take a certain criminal case about the investigation of an organized criminal group, in which 10 numbers are listed. You need to listen to a person who has nothing to do with this investigation. You simply get this number and say that you have operational information that this is the number of one of the leaders of a criminal group,” say knowledgeable people from the website “Agentura.ru”.

Thus, through SORM you can listen to anyone on “legal” grounds. This is such a secure connection.

2. Wiretapping through an operator

Cellular operators generally look at the call list and movement history of a mobile phone, which is registered in various base stations according to its physical location, without any problems. To obtain call records, like the intelligence services, the operator needs to connect to the SORM system.

For Russian law enforcement agencies, there is little point in installing Trojans, unless they need the ability to activate a smartphone’s microphone and record, even if the user is not talking on a mobile phone. In other cases, SORM does an excellent job of wiretapping. Therefore, Russian intelligence services are not very active in introducing Trojans. But for unofficial use it is a favorite hacking tool.

Wives spy on their husbands, businessmen study the activities of competitors. In Russia, Trojan software is widely used for wiretapping by private clients.

The Trojan is installed on a smartphone in various ways: through a fake software update, through an email with a fake application, through a vulnerability in Android or in popular software like iTunes.

New vulnerabilities in programs are found literally every day, and then they are closed very slowly. For example, the FinFisher Trojan was installed through a vulnerability in iTunes, which Apple did not close from 2008 to 2011. Through this hole, it was possible to install any software on behalf of Apple on the victim’s computer.

It is possible that such a Trojan is already installed on your smartphone. Have you ever felt like your smartphone battery has been draining a little faster than expected lately?

6. Application update

Instead of installing a special spy Trojan, an attacker can do an even smarter thing: choose an application that you yourself voluntarily install on your smartphone, after which you give it full authority to access phone calls, record conversations and transfer data to a remote server.

For example, it could be a popular game that is distributed through “left” mobile application catalogs. At first glance, it’s an ordinary game, but with the function of wiretapping and recording conversations. Very comfortably. The user manually allows the program to access the Internet, where it sends files with recorded conversations.

Alternatively, malicious application functionality may be added as an update.

7. Fake base station

A fake base station has a stronger signal than a real base station. Due to this, it intercepts subscriber traffic and allows you to manipulate data on the phone. Fake base stations are known to be widely used by law enforcement agencies abroad.

In the USA, a model of fake BS called StingRay is popular.

And it's not just law enforcement agencies that use such devices. For example, merchants in China often use fake BS to send mass spam to mobile phones that are located within a radius of hundreds of meters around. In general, in China, the production of “fake honeycombs” has been ramped up, so in local stores it is not a problem to find such a device, assembled literally on your knees.

8. Hacking a femtocell

Recently, some companies have been using femtocells - low-power miniature cellular stations that intercept traffic from mobile phones within range. Such a femtocell allows you to record calls from all company employees before redirecting the calls to the base station of cellular operators.

Accordingly, to wiretap a subscriber, you need to install your own femtocell or hack the operator’s original femtocell.

9. Mobile complex for remote wiretapping

In this case, the radio antenna is installed close to the subscriber (operates at a distance of up to 500 meters). A directional antenna connected to the computer intercepts all phone signals, and when the work is completed, it is simply taken away.

Unlike a fake femtocell or Trojan, here the attacker does not have to worry about getting into the site and installing a femtocell, and then removing it (or removing the Trojan without leaving any traces of hacking).

The capabilities of modern PCs are enough to record a GSM signal on a large number of frequencies, and then crack the encryption using rainbow tables (here is a description of the technique from a well-known specialist in this field, Carsten Nohl).

If you voluntarily carry a universal bug with you, you automatically collect an extensive dossier on yourself. The only question is who will need this dossier. But if he needs it, he can get it without much difficulty.

Previously, so-called wiretapping of mobile phones was available only to representatives of the special services. Currently, technology does not stand still, and an ordinary person can install wiretapping on a phone for their own purposes.

What is cell phone wiretapping most often used for?

Often cell phone wiretapping used by companies if there is a suspicion of information leakage, to check the reliability of a business partner, some citizens conduct wiretapping in order to verify marital fidelity, monitor their children and their movements, and much more.

At the moment, there are several methods of wiretapping a phone. Among the most popular are the method of creating a transit base station and the method of intercepting data through a terrestrial transmission channel. The first method is based on the fact that the phone, when making calls, looks for a base station that has the highest signal strength and the largest number of time slots. When creating such a station, the signal from the phone being monitored will go to it. Certainly, wiretapping cell phones This method has a number of disadvantages. The base station must be located as close as possible to the device being listened to; significant funds are required to create it, since creating such a device from scrap materials at home is extremely problematic, and the work of many qualified specialists in the laboratory is required.

The second method is simpler. In cellular communications, transmitted data is encrypted on the way from the phone to the nearest base station in the radio frequency transmission cycle, and then all data is sent in unencrypted form. Such wiretapping via cell phone needs access to an operator.

The above methods allow wiretapping without direct contact with the phone of the person being tapped. There are other methods that require certain manipulations with the telephone device of the person being tapped to establish wiretapping. This could be installing a bug in the device or installing a special program. Is it possible wiretapping cell phones for free? Quite if it is possible to install the program on the desired device. Among the most popular programs for wiretapping is ShadowGuard.ru.

What features does this software offer?

Wiretapping of telephone conversations;
interception of SMS messages;
wiretapping the area around a specific mobile phone;
determining the location of a specific device.

Is there an option that downloaded upon request " cell phone wiretapping program"Won't the software work on a specific phone? Of course, there is such an option. But for most models of phones and smartphones, the program works perfectly, and the subscriber does not even realize that it is present in his own phone.

Mobile wiretapping is currently available to ordinary citizens. Just find it on the Internet programs for wiretapping cell phones and download them. Next, select the moment to install the software on the desired device. Conversations are not only listened to, but also recorded. With modern programs, you can constantly be aware of all conversations and movements of the subscriber you are interested in.

• SIM card, number, tariff

  To find out the name and conditions of the current tariff, go to your Personal Account and select the “Tariff” section or dial a free command * 105 * 3 #

  You can change the tariff

  • on the website: select a new tariff, click on the “Switch to tariff” button on the page;
  • in the MegaFon application or Personal Account.

  You can switch to any tariff except the archive one. The cost of the transition is indicated on the page of the selected tariff.

  When changing the tariff, the packages of minutes, SMS and Internet connected within the current tariff will “burn out” and will not be valid on the new tariff. The written-off subscription fee is not recalculated.

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  • How to unblock a number?
    • If you run out of money in your account and the number is blocked, top up your balance. The number is activated after the debt is repaid.
    • If you have not used a number for more than 90 days, it may be blocked. To restore your number, take your passport to a MegaFon salon. If the number has not been transferred to another subscriber during this time, you will receive a new SIM card with the same number.
      Find out if you can restore your number by sending a free SMS from your current MegaFon SIM to. In the message, indicate the number you want to restore and the owner's full name.
    • If the number is blocked after losing your SIM card, you can get a free new SIM card with the same number by going to a MegaFon salon with your passport.
    • If you have set a block, the number will be unblocked automatically on the day you selected for the block to end.

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  • How to get a new SIM card while keeping your phone number?

    Apply with your passport to any MegaFon salon in the Home region in which the agreement was concluded. You can get a new SIM card for free and continue to use your number. The tariff and all terms of service remain the same; there is no need to enter into a new contract for the provision of communication services.

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  • How do I keep my number?

    The number remains yours as long as the balance is positive. If you do not use the number and do not activate the blocking service, then at least once every 90 days you need to use communication services: outgoing calls, incoming calls, sending SMS, sending and receiving MMS, accessing the Internet. If you do not use communication services for more than 90 calendar days in a row on call tariffs and longer than 180 calendar days in a row on Internet tariffs, the subscription fee for maintaining the number begins to be charged daily.

    In case of non-use of communication services on any of the subscriber numbers combined on one personal account for more than 90 (ninety) calendar days in a row, the contract for the provision of communication services in relation to this subscriber number is considered terminated at the initiative of the subscriber.

    The amount of the subscription fee for maintaining the number, the conditions for its debiting and the period at the end of which the contract for the provision of communication services will be terminated and the number can be transferred to another subscriber is indicated in the description of your tariff. You can find it in the Tariffs or Tariffs Archive section.

    If you do not use communication services for more than 90 days and the Personal Account balance is zero or negative, the contract is considered terminated on your initiative. If the number has not been transferred to another person, it can be restored by filling out an application at the MegaFon salon.

    If you plan to not use mobile communications for a long time (more than 90 days), block your number.

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  • • Use the service Telephone codes of mobile operators. Enter the mobile number you are interested in in the search bar and click the “Check” button. The carrier and region will appear below the search bar.
    • Type the command * 629 # . Then enter the mobile number you want to verify in any format. Operator and region information will appear on the screen.

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  • How to renew the contract or change the number?

    You can choose a number when concluding a contract for the provision of communication services or replace your current phone number.

    Choose a beautiful, easy-to-remember number in an online store or in a MegaFon showroom.

    The cost of the room depends on the room class: simple, bronze, silver, gold, platinum, and the type of numbering: federal or city. More details about the cost of the room in the description of the service Select a room.

    The service operates in two modes:

    • one-way: the caller will hear the message “The subscriber’s device is turned off or is out of network coverage”;
    • two-way mode: the caller will receive an SMS with your new number.

    In any mode, you will receive an SMS with the number of the person who called your previous number.

    The service does not work if the balance on the old number is negative or zero, or if the old SIM card is blocked.

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• Services, options

  • Go to the Balances section for service packages in your Personal Account.
  • Open the Balances section for service packages in the MegaFon application. .
  • Set up the widget.

  Widget is an element of the MegaFon Personal Account application. It is not necessary to log into the application - the remaining minutes, SMS, megabytes, and Personal Account balance will be displayed on the screen of your smartphone.

  To use the widget, install the MegaFon Personal Account application on your smartphone/tablet. For Android OS, the application must be installed in the smartphone memory, not in the SD memory. Go to your smartphone's settings and activate the widget.

  The appearance of the widget and the number of balances that will be simultaneously displayed on the smartphone screen differ depending on the OS.

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• Mobile Internet

  • What to do if the mobile Internet does not work or the speed has decreased?
    1. Check your balance and top it up if necessary. To check your balance, type the command * 100 # or go to your Personal Account. The Internet only works with a positive balance. If you have recently topped up your account, wait a few minutes for the internet to work again.
    2. Check the balance of your Internet package. Open the MegaFon application or go to your Personal Account Balances for service packages. If the included Internet capacity has run out, connect one of the options to extend the Internet.
    3. Check if you have the Mobile Internet service connected. To do this, go to your Personal Account and in the “Services” section, select Services and options.
    4. Make sure you have Data Transfer mode enabled. You can check this in the settings of your smartphone or tablet in the “Data transfer”, “Data connection” or “Mobile network” section (the name may differ in different devices).
    5. Reboot your device (turn it off and on).
    6. Turn off Wi-Fi on your smartphone/tablet (when using a router from MegaFon, Wi-Fi should remain on).
    7. Move the SIM card to another device. If the mobile Internet also does not work in another device, contact the nearest MegaFon store with an identification document to replace the SIM card. When replacing a SIM card, the phone number will not change; the service is provided free of charge.
       To find out the address of the nearest salon, open the MegaFon application.
    8. When using the Internet via a modem/router: Reinstall the MegaFon Internet application, try connecting the modem/router to another USB port on the computer, update the software of your modem/router. You can download the latest versions of the software for free from the MegaFon online store. Find your modem or router in the directory and go to the "Files" tab.

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  • What is 4G+, how to start using it and how does the transition from a 2G/3G network to 4G+ happen?

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  Use any convenient method:

  • Dial a free command * 512 # , and you will receive an SMS with information about the latest debits from your account.

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  • How to top up your account?

    Choose any convenient method:

    1. Top up your account from a bank card or e-wallet in the Payment section.
    2. On the main page of your Personal Account, you can top up your account, as well as the account of another Megafon subscriber, with a bank card.
    3. Set up Autopayment yourself in your Personal Account on the website or contact a specialist at a MegaFon salon for help. With this service, the balance will be replenished automatically from your bank card.
    4. If you can’t pay right now, use the Promised payment service.
    5. Another MegaFon subscriber can transfer money to you from their account using the Mobile Transfer service. To send a request to another subscriber, use the free Pay for me service.
    6. If you are a Sberbank client and your bank card is linked to a phone number, indicate the required amount in an SMS and send it to the number or use the Sberbank Online application.

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  • How to stay in touch with a negative or zero balance?

    To make a call with insufficient balance, use the Call at a friend’s expense service, and your interlocutor will pay for the call.
    Dial " 000 " and subscriber number, starting with " 8 " or " 7 ", For example: 000792ХXXXXXXX.

    The service is valid only for calls to MegaFon numbers.

    To credit a conditional amount to your account at any convenient time and continue to use mobile services, activate Promised payment by typing the command * 106 # . The service is paid.

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  • Mobile subscriptions

    Mobile subscriptions are information and entertainment services that combine music, videos, pictures, texts and mobile applications of various topics. Check out the full catalogue.

    The subscription fee is charged in accordance with the Subscription Terms.

    To find out which subscriptions are connected, go to your Personal Account, select the “Services and Options” section, the “My” subsection, which will display a list of subscriptions connected to your number

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    • How to unsubscribe?

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    • Can I listen to a recording of my telephone conversation?

      MegaFon does not record subscriber calls.

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    • How to set up call forwarding?

      You can set up or cancel call forwarding in the phone menu or in your Personal Account. For conditions and cost of setting up forwarding, see the service page.

      If the established forwarding does not work, check whether there are any restrictions on your number and whether the number is entered correctly.

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    To find out who called you while your phone was turned off, out of network coverage, or while you were unable to answer, activate the Who Called+ service. You will receive an SMS about a missed call on behalf of the person who tried to call you. The SMS will indicate the number and time of calls.

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    • What is VoLTE technology and what is needed to use it?

      1 - Fire Department;

      2 - police;

      3 - emergency;

      4 — emergency gas network service.

      Emergency numbers:

      Emergency - ;

      Calls to emergency numbers are free. You can call if there is no money in your account, and even from a phone without a SIM card.

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    • What to do if your phone is lost or stolen?

      Block the number.

      Free blocking period - 7 days. Then the subscription fee begins to be charged. All communication services on the number before the blocking is activated are paid by you. If your phone is stolen or lost, please notify us as soon as possible. This is necessary so that a thief or person who finds your phone cannot use the money in your account.

      Get a new SIM card with your old number.

      Try to find the phone.

      Contact the police and file a theft report. Your phone may be able to be detected.

      If you've lost your iPhone or iPad, use Find My iPhone.

      If you have lost your Android phone, use the device search function.

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    • How to protect yourself from scammers?

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    • How are emergency communications services provided?

  • Roaming

    • How to use communication services when traveling around Russia and the world?

      When traveling around our country, no additional actions are required to use communication services. The only condition is that you must have a positive balance.

      When you go to other countries, as well as to the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, where there is no MegaFon network, you need to make sure that you have the Roaming service activated. It is needed so that you can use communication services in the networks of other operators.

      • 8 800 550-05-00 +7 926 111-05-00 from anywhere in the world;
      • Personal account or MegaFon application;
      • go to the MegaFon salon with your passport.

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    The cost of communication services when traveling in Russia may differ from the cost in the Home region. You can find out detailed conditions in your Personal Account, in the description of your tariff or using a free command * 139 #

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    There is no MegaFon network in the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, so make sure before your trip that you have the Roaming service activated. It is needed so that you can use communication services in the networks of other operators.

    How to find out if roaming is enabled on your number:

    • call the Help Desk at 8 800 550 0500 in Russia or +7 926 111-05-00 from anywhere in the world;
    • write to the support chat in your Personal Account or the MegaFon application;
    • go to the MegaFon salon with your passport.

    You can find out the cost of services on the page or in the description of your tariff.

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    • How to connect and disconnect services in roaming and spend less?

      The easiest and most convenient way is the MegaFon mobile application or Personal Account. You can check your balance, connect or disconnect services and options, order detailed expenses and ask questions to support in the chat.

      When roaming, you do not need to change your mobile Internet settings.

      Note!

      Some phones may limit data usage while roaming. Go to settings and check if mobile Internet is enabled in roaming.

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